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Abstract 
Various polls reveal that Europeans, even if aware of the looming pension crisis, generally resist 
pension reforms. In this research report, we show that resistance may be general but it is not 
uniform. People may oppose reforms but they reject different components of the reform 
proposals depending on their labour market position, income and age. We analyse the attitudes 
of nearly 16,000 respondents from the EU-15 countries towards the role of funded pillars, 
retirement age, the labour market participation of older workers, gender equality and 
immigration, as well as preferences towards intra- and intergenerational redistribution in the 
pension systems. 
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Executive summary 
Aim and methods of the study 
•  We analyse European public opinion on various issues related to the public pension 
system. Our aim is to contribute to discussions on the relationship between the political 
feasibility and financial sustainability of various institutional alternatives. Our results 
show that diverse social groups may support the present systems for different reasons. 
Thus, politically feasible reforms could be designed based on the differences in 
resistance, even though these measures may not necessarily be perfect solutions from the 
point of view of financial sustainability. 
•  Our research has been carried out within the framework of Work Package 3 of the 
Adequacy of Old-Age Income Maintenance (AIM) project. We analyse the data of the 
European Commission’s Special Eurobarometer Report No. 161 on the Future of Pension 
Systems  (January 2004) and the Special Eurobarometer Report No. 162 on Social 
Precarity and Social Integration (October 2002) based on Eurobarometer Wave 56.1. The 
fieldwork for the survey was carried out in September and October 2001 in the 15 EU 
member countries. In selecting issues and structuring research questions based on the 
fairly comprehensive survey, we have followed the guidelines of Commission documents 
on EU priorities. We analyse public attitudes towards the role of funded pillars, 
retirement age, the labour market participation of older workers, gender equality, 
immigration and preferences on intra- and intergenerational redistribution in the pension 
systems. We apply regression techniques in order to separate the effects that gender, age, 
income, education, ideology and the current pension regime have on public opinion. 
Public opinion and EU priorities 
•  Our results show that the majority of respondents are aware of the serious problems 
population ageing will pose in most of the EU-15 countries. Cross-country differences in 
opinion reflect the degree of seriousness of the problem. Awareness of the looming crisis 
is a matter of education and political consciousness, rather than ideological stance.  
•  When it comes to the measures required, however, even those respondents who 
acknowledge the threat of demographic problems appear to be fairly reluctant to endorse 
them: most of the reform proposals are refused by the majority. 
•  The idea of a pension system predominantly based on funded pillars is not very popular 
among European voters, though they may support an increasing role of private funds. If 
respondents are asked about the freedom of accumulating contributions in private 
insurance funds, strong support can be observed in favour of a private pillar. Still many 
people, albeit a minority of the population (46%), support a combination of a state 
pension providing a bare minimum and a mandatory, privately funded pillar. 
Nevertheless, when asked specifically about the optimal combination of pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) and funded schemes only 7% support a solution that predominately involves  
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private insurance. The cross-country differences in popular preferences resemble the 
variance of European pension schemes. The higher the level of funding, the more support 
private arrangements receive. 
•  Efforts to place stronger emphasis on actuarial fairness do not receive widespread 
support. Only a minority (23%) embraces the idea of a higher retirement age. It seems 
problematic that reluctance is stronger in those countries where the existing system is 
more generous. In addition, there is no absolute majority behind a proposal for higher 
benefits rewarding retirement above the official retirement age. 
•  The European public seems to be confused or uncertain concerning flexible retirement, so 
the framing of the question strongly influences answers. If the general issue of gradual 
retirement is addressed, widespread support (73%) for reforms can be observed. Another 
question, which asks whether pensioners should be allowed to earn as much as they want 
on top of their pensions, also receives majority support (58%). This picture radically 
changes if the issue is approached from another side. The proposal according to which 
“older workers should be forced to retire at a fixed age” enjoys majority support (57%). 
The idea that a possible (and desirable) way to decrease (youth) unemployment is to force 
workers in their late 50s out of employment is also shared by a majority (55%) of 
respondents. There are more people against flexible (and postponed) retirement in those 
countries in which the pension systems are more generous. On the other hand, a larger 
proportion of respondents stick to the idea of flexibility, in which funded pillars play an 
important role.  
•  Although documents presenting the view of the Commission on pension systems strongly 
emphasise the importance of gender equality, the Eurobarometer survey is of no help to 
policy-makers. Questions on gender equality address the issue at a fairly general level. It 
seems that the principle of equal treatment of the sexes is deeply embedded in modern 
European democracies. Indeed, equal treatment is supported by a majority even if it 
possibly widens the gender gap in living conditions and opportunities. 
•  The analysis of attitudes towards immigration as a partial solution to demographic 
problems points to a somewhat paradoxical link between pension regimes and public 
opinion. The proposal for more immigration is more popular in countries in which 
private, funded pillars play an important role, that is, where the pension regimes are less 
dependent on the demographic composition of the population. 
Intra- and intergenerational redistribution 
•  Our modelling strategy also aims at separating the attitudes of pensioners towards 
intergenerational transfers from those relating to intra-generational redistribution. Results 
reveal that various social groups may support the present system for different reasons.  
•  The current institutional structure highlights the possible political costs of postponing 
reforms: where funded pillars are weak, taxpayers’ resistance to financing the 
maintenance of the existing level of benefits in unfunded pillars is strong and vice versa. 
•  Evidence of the effects of ideology, income and union membership are among the key 
results of the analysis, as the three groups have markedly different preferences.  
–  Ideologically determined left-wing respondents support the increase of inter- as 
well as intra-generational redistribution in the pension system.  
–  Those who are poor support intra-generational redistribution, but they are more 
likely to oppose feeding the ever-growing present regime with increasing PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | iii 
contributions. That is, at least a segment of the low-income population realise that 
a higher level of average pensions does not necessarily help them. They also see 
that they are potential beneficiaries of intra-generational redistribution within the 
pension system. 
–  The attitudes of union members support the idea of higher contributions if that is 
the price of higher benefits. By contrast, they do not seem to differ from other 
groups of workers in supporting intra-generational redistribution. Although union 
membership is often regarded as a proxy for left-wing ideology, the two groups 
clearly differ concerning their attitudes towards pension reforms.  
Framing the pension debate 
•  Lack of political feasibility regarding some important reform proposals may stem from 
framing effects. The Eurobarometer survey clearly shows that the way questions are 
worded influences attitudes. The impact of agenda-setting in public discourse on pension 
reform deserves more attention than it is usually given. The mainstream of public 
discourse on pension issues introduces a bias against reforms. This attitude comes from a 
poor understanding of the characteristics of welfare institutions. Certain properties, such 
as the PAYG nature of the pension system, are often ignored while the features of other 
welfare institutions, such as social assistance, are attributed to it.  
•  A shift from questions concerning, for example, the role of market-based solutions or the 
size of the public scheme to the identification of the real losers of the current regimes and 
their prospects under proposed reforms may help policy-makers. If efforts to secure the 
sustainability of the pension systems were successfully separated from intentions to 
diminish the overall size of the welfare state, pension reforms would be more feasible. 
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1. Introduction 
The persistence of present demographic trends in European welfare states will impose an 
increasingly heavy burden on social security systems over the next decades. In many countries, 
the current levels of contributions and old-age benefits of the predominant pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) systems will become unsustainable over the long run. A vast body of literature 
discusses possible institutional changes targeting long-term sustainability. Yet experience from 
the fate of several previous reform proposals in Europe suggests that the political feasibility of 
many of the proposed reforms is questionable.  
In this study, we analyse European public opinion on various issues related to the public 
pension system. Our aim is to contribute to the discussion about the relationship between the 
political feasibility and financial sustainability of various institutional alternatives. Our results 
show that diverse social groups may support the present system for various reasons. Thus, 
politically feasible reforms could be designed based on the differences of resistance, even 
though these measures may not necessarily be optimal in terms of financial sustainability.  
Our research has been carried out within the framework of Work Package 3 of the Adequacy of 
Old-Age Income Maintenance (AIM) project. We analyse the data of the Special Eurobarometer 
Survey on Pension Policy and Pension Reform (Eurobarometer 161/Wave 56.1 – see European 
Opinion Research Group, 2004). The fieldwork in this survey was carried out in September and 
October 2001 within the 15 EU member states. The questionnaire also contains another Special 
Eurobarometer Survey, on Social Precarity and Social Integration, from which we also use 
variables in some aspects of our analysis. In this respect, we have an extended information base 
compared with a previous analysis of the survey (Kohl, 2003).  
In selecting issues and structuring research questions based on this fairly comprehensive survey, 
we have followed the guidelines of European Commission documents on EU priorities. After 
briefly discussing public awareness of the problems caused by demographic trends, in section 2 
we compare several priorities laid down by the Commission – such as the role of funded pillars, 
retirement age, the labour market participation of older workers, gender equality and 
immigration – with public opinion. In addition, in section 3 we analyse two general principles 
underlying many reform proposals as well as EU objectives, in particular intergenerational 
equity and intra-generational solidarity.  
2.  EU priorities and public opinion 
In this section, we address several issues that are highlighted in Commission documents as 
priorities of pension reforms in Europe. We present the basic distributions of answers and focus 
our attention on cross-country differences.
1 In addition to presenting cross-tables, we also apply 
                                                 
∗ We gratefully acknowledge comments on an earlier version of the paper by Tamás Bartus, Péter Róbert, 
Tamás Rudas, András Simonovits, Arjan Soede, Cok Vrooman and participants of the AIM Workshop in 
London, 4-5 May 2006. We also benefited from consultations with John Gelissen and Jürgen Kohl. The 
authors take full responsibility for the mistakes and shortcomings of the study. 
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regression techniques in order to separate the effects of our explanatory variables such as 
gender, age, income, education and ideology, on attitudes towards the pension system. We also 
analyse the independent effect of the current institutional structure of the pension system on 
public preferences concerning pension reform. For this purpose, we adopt the typology of 
pension regimes by Soede & Vrooman (2006). They carried out a categorical principal 
component analysis (CatPCA procedure) for a comprehensive and quantitative characterisation 
of pension regimes in modern welfare states. Data on pension schemes were gathered under 34 
headings. As a result of the analysis, the relative positions of various pension regimes were 
determined under two main categories.  
The first category, termed ‘pension level/wealth’, indicates the degree of ‘generosity’ of the 
pension system. It is closely related to the average replacement rate, pension level, public 
expenditures on pension benefits and pension wealth as defined by the OECD (2005).
2 
Mediterranean countries, such as Italy, Greece and Spain, have the highest scores in this 
category. Austria, Finland and the Netherlands also have higher than average scores. Ireland and 
the UK can be found at the other end of the scale. 
The second category, the level of privatisation and funding, captures the role of private and 
funded pillars. Pension regimes that include a defined contribution scheme, a funded pillar or a 
private segment in the mandatory system, such as in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
have high scores in the second category. Belgium and Spain have low scores in this category.  
2.1  Public awareness of demographic problems 
Before turning to attitudes towards specific policy measures and institutions, we take a detour to 
consider European awareness of the looming pension crisis. No widespread popular support for 
reforms can be expected if most people find their existing system sustainable over the long run. 
The Eurobarometer survey includes a question about population ageing as a potential problem.
3 
It seems that the majority of respondents are aware of the problems caused by present 
demographic trends (see Boeri et al., 2002; Boeri, 2004). According to 61% of respondents, 
population ageing will pose a major problem in the future. Only 8% think that societal ageing is 
not a problem at all. 
Nonetheless, considerable cross-country differences can be found in the distribution of 
responses (Figure 1). Greek respondents seem particularly anxious, for instance 86% of them 
see population ageing as a major problem. The Irish are much more relaxed: less than a third of 
them think that demographic trends will pose a major problem for their country. This stance 
reflects the more favourable demographic structure of Ireland. Citizens of the UK are also 
optimistic: anxious respondents do not form a majority there. Regression analysis confirms the 
hypothesis that more respondents are anxious about demographic trends in countries in which 
the present form of the pension system is less likely to remain sustainable over the long run. The 
proportion of those who see population ageing as a major problem is higher in countries with 
more generous systems. By contrast, countries with stronger funded pillars, that is, with a 
pension scheme less dependent on demography, have lower levels of respondents worrying 
about the ageing of society.  
                                                 
2 The average pension wealth is the estimated actuarial value of the pension benefit of a production 
worker with a full employment history as a proportion of economy-wide average earnings. 
3 The question is “The population in our country is ageing, due to lower birth rates and increasing life 
expectancy. Do you think that in the future this will pose…1) a major problem, 2) a minor problem, 3) no 
problem at all?” PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 3 
 
Approaching retirement age, respondents become more anxious about the demographic 
structure. Population ageing will pose a major problem according to 52% of the 15–24 year-old 
respondents, against 67% of the 45–54 year-old cohort. Among the elderly, the proportion of 
those who think that societal ageing will pose a major problem is somewhat below that of the 
45–54 year-olds. Regression analysis shows that the evaluation of this situation is not 
overshadowed by an ideological divide. Ideologically more determined (and probably politically 
more conscious) respondents, left- and right-wing alike, are more likely to see problems in 
demographic trends. Citizens who are more educated are also more likely to be aware of the 
problems of an ageing society. Active workers, who should bear the increasingly heavy tax 
burdens, are understandably more anxious than others are. Nevertheless, workers with a high 
living standard, who also pay more taxes, are not more likely than other workers are to see 
population ageing as a major problem. Those facing financial problems, on the other hand, are 
more anxious about demographic trends.  
These results may raise the hopes of policy-makers for the political feasibility of pension 
reforms aiming at sustainability. The majority of respondents think that societal ageing will 
pose serious problems in most of the EU-15 countries. Cross-country differences in opinion 
reflect the degree of seriousness of the problem. Awareness of the looming crisis is a matter of 
education and political consciousness, rather than ideological stance (Table 1).
4  
The following sub-sections reveal a slightly more complex picture. Our results demonstrate that 
when it comes to the measures proposed to alleviate the looming crisis, even those respondents 
who acknowledge the existence of demographic problems appear to be fairly reluctant to 
support them: most of the reform proposals are refused by a majority (see Boeri et al., 2002; 
Boeri, 2004).  
                                                 
4  See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of variables. Regression coefficients are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
Figure 1.  Population ageing will pose a major problem. 
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Table 1. Regression results on opinions of whether population ageing will pose a major 
problem  
  Population ageing will be a major problem
Individual-level characteristics 
 
Male 
 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  –
 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)  
 
Worse off (financial problems) 
 
Has a job  +
 
Has a university degree  +
 
Right-wing (strongly)  +
 
Left-wing (strongly)  +
 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
 
Pension level/wealth (score)  +
 
Role of private/funded pillars in the mandatory system 
(score) 
 
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.01) 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
 
2.2  The role of private and other funded pillars  
There appear to be significant gender differences in opinion. Men are more likely than women 
are to prefer private and occupational schemes to a PAYG system. (Some 34% of male and 27% 
of female respondents oppose the dominance of a PAYG scheme.) This may reflect the fact that 
PAYG schemes are often redistributive from men to women. A switch to a funded scheme, or 
indeed any scheme based on individual accounts, may harm women if these reforms do not 
compensate them for their work in the household (as women carry most of the burden of non-
market household production, including raising the next generation of contributors to a PAYG 
scheme in most European societies). The prospect of increasing gender inequality contrasts 
sharply with the explicit goal of the Commission to narrow the gender gap in old-age benefits as 
well (e.g. European Commission, 1999, pp. 8, 16). We return to the gender issue below. 
The Commission has emphasised the importance of developing a sustainable combination of 
pillars for a long time (European Commission, 1999, p. 15). The Eurobarometer survey includes 
questions about the public support for private funds. Responses depend largely on how the issue 
is framed. If one asks about the possibility of saving contributions in private funds, significant 
support can be observed. In the EU-15 countries, 78% of respondents agree with the statement 
“the government should allow people to put their contributions into private pension funds or life 
insurance policies of their choice”. This does not necessarily imply support for substituting a 
funded scheme for a PAYG system. Still, a large minority (46%) support a combination of 
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minimum pensions with additional mandatory provisions for old age. Yet, among the responses 
to the question explicitly addressing the desired roles of PAYG and funded systems,
5 support 
for PAYG systems seems fairly solid: while 57% of respondents think that pensions should be 
provided mainly by PAYG public pension schemes, only 7% of them support the dominance of 
solutions based on private insurance.  
The cross-country differences in popular preferences resemble the variance of European pension 
schemes (Figure 2). A kind of status quo effect can be observed here in that respondents tend to 
prefer those schemes (such as occupational, PAYG and private schemes)
6 that are relatively 
more important in their respective country. This result is partly in line with the findings of 
Gelissen (2001), based on his analysis of an earlier Eurobarometer dataset.
7 Right-wing voters 
tend to be in favour of private arrangements. In addition, those having a job, higher income and 
education are, ceteris paribus, more likely to support the dominance of occupational or private 
schemes (Table 2). 
 
 
                                                 
5 The question is “How do you think that pensions should be provided…a) mainly by state or public 
pension schemes, financed from taxes and contributions; b) mainly by occupational schemes, financed 
from employers’ and their employees’ contributions; c) mainly by private arrangements between 
individuals and insurance companies, banks, etc.?” 
6 The typology is from Soede & Vrooman (2006). 
7 Owing to differences between his and our models, any comparison is questionable. The results in the 
Eurobarometer survey for Italy and Germany resemble the findings of Boeri et al. (2002). 
Figure 2. PAYG system should NOT dominate. 
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Table 2. Regression results on opinions about whether PAYG schemes, occupational systems or 
privately funded arrangements should dominate 
  PAYG systems should not dominate 
Individual-level characteristics 
 
Male  +
 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years) 
 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)   +
 
Worse off (financial problems)  –
 
Has a job  +
 
Has a university degree  +
 
Right-wing (strongly)  +
 
Left-wing (strongly) 
 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
 
Pension level/wealth (score) 
 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory system 
(score)  (+)*
   
Notes: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.01); * p<0.1; in the case of country-level 
characteristics, we indicate the signs of coefficients in parentheses if 0.01<p<0.1 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
 
2.3  Increasing the retirement age 
In addition to considering structural changes, the Commission also placed emphasis on 
parametric reforms of existing systems. Raising the actual retirement age is one of the top 
priorities among these reform proposals (e.g. European Commission, 2005a, p. 4). Introducing a 
higher statutory retirement age is a possible way but not the only one to extend working life. 
Later retirement may be rewarded by higher pension benefits or early retirement can be 
punished by lower benefits. These kinds of incentives are already widely used in some member 
states. The Eurobarometer provides evidence on public attitudes towards such reforms.  
Only a minority support the idea of a higher retirement age.
8 A mere 23% of respondents would 
agree with such measures. The resistance is particularly strong in Sweden and Greece (where 
only 12% and 13% support a higher retirement age), while a large proportion of respondents 
(41%) support the idea in Ireland. In general, in countries with a more generous system, 
respondents are less likely to support increases in the retirement age. That is, resistance seems to 
be stronger where reform would be more urgent. That being stated, adopting a more balanced 
question format, based on a ‘contingent valuation’ technique, Boeri et al. (2002) found stronger 
support for increasing the retirement age (in Italy). As far as individual characteristics are 
concerned, the more educated and ideologically right-wing respondents are, ceteris paribus, 
more strongly in favour of later retirement than the average, while those who have a job, 
predominantly prefer keeping the existing rules on retirement ages (Table 3). 
 
                                                 
8 The question is “Please tell me for each of the following whether you strongly agree, slightly agree, 
slightly disagree or strongly disagree...The age of retirement should be raised so that people work longer 
and spend less time in retirement.” PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 7 
Table 3. Regression results on attitudes towards retirement age and pension benefits 
 
Increase of 
retirement 
age 
Higher pension 
for later 
retirement 
Lower pension 
for early 
retirement 
Individual-level characteristics      
Male   + + 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)   –  – 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)       
Worse off (financial problems)     – 
Has a job  –    
Has a university degree  +   + 
Right-wing (strongly)  + +  + 
Left-wing (strongly)   –   
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime      
Pension level/wealth (score)  (–)*   + 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory 
system (score)      
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.01); * p<0.1 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
 
Setting the ‘default’ retirement age may not be the most important issue, since there is already a 
considerable disparity between the official and the effective retirement ages in most EU 
countries. Applying the technique by Latulippe (1996) to calculate effective retirement age from 
labour force participation figures, the effective retirement age for men across the EU-15 
countries was about 2.5 years below the standard age of entitlement to public old-age pensions 
in 2003 (weighted averages; calculations from OECD labour force figures). The Commission 
prefers a flexible retirement process. The questionnaire includes a question about later 
retirement and another one about early retirement, offering a chance to capture the issue.  
We found no absolute majority behind the proposal of postponed retirement being rewarded by 
higher benefits.
9  Only 45% of the total sample agrees, although the proposal has majority 
support in Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and Austria. In more generous 
systems, the level of support tends to be slightly higher than average, while the opposite is true 
in countries with stronger funded pillars. This moderate support is not a result of resistance by 
pensioners. The highest level of support for the proposal can be observed in the oldest age 
groups. Right-wing voters are also likely to be in favour of such a reward for later retirement, 
while left-wing respondents tend to oppose it.  
As in the case of the role of the funded pillar, a significant gender effect can be observed 
(Figure 3). Again, men are more likely than women are to prefer reform steps, in this case 
measures rewarding later retirement (47% of male and 43% of female respondents support such 
a proposal). 
                                                 
9 The exact wording of the question is as follows: “I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, 
slightly agree, slightly disagree or strongly disagree…Someone who retires after the normal retirement 
age should receive a higher pension.” 8 | JANKY & GÁL 
The level of support for reduced benefits for early retirees is similar to that of rewarding later 
retirement: 43% of respondents are in favour.
10 So are the variances by gender, age, income and 
ideological stance. In this case, education also matters. Country effects also seem to be stronger: 
the concept of reduced pensions is more likely to be accepted in countries with larger and more 
generous pension systems.  
2.4  Promoting the labour market participation of the elderly 
It is among the top priorities of the Commission to foster the labour market participation of 
older workers (e.g. European Commission, 2005a, p. 3) in particular as the effective retirement 
age tends to differ significantly from the official retirement age throughout the EU. One way to 
achieve this goal is to promote flexible bridges between work and retirement (e.g. European 
Commission, 2005a, p. 9). We analysed the answers to five questions on this issue. The overall 
picture is mixed, and it seems clear that much depends on the framing of the problem.  
If the general question of gradual retirement is addressed, widespread support for reforms can 
be observed. Some 73% of respondents agree that older workers should be allowed to retire 
gradually.
11 There are considerable differences across member states, though the proposal has a 
majority of support everywhere. Another question asks whether pensioners should be allowed to 
earn as much as they want on top of their pensions.
12 This proposal is also endorsed by the 
majority albeit more narrowly than the previous general principle: 58% of respondents support 
it. In some countries, such as France and Italy, the proposal has only minority support. In the 
Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and Sweden, on the other hand, the proportion of those supporting 
it is close to or over 70%. The regression analysis also implies that in generous (mostly 
                                                 
10 The question is “I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree…Older workers who retire early should accept a reduced pension.” 
11 The question is “I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree…Older workers should be allowed to retire gradually from work (e.g. to combine a 
partial pension with reduced work).” 
12 The question is “I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree…Pensioners should be allowed to earn as much as they want on top of their 
pension[s].” 
Figure 3. Opinions on retirement age and pension benefit. 
Level of agreement (%)
22,4
42,7 40,6
23,0
47,1 44,7
Increase of retirement age Higher pension for later
retirement
Lower pension for early
retirement
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001)
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Bismarckian) systems this kind of reform is less popular (Table 4). In countries with a 
significant funded pillar, people are more ready to accept part-time retirement. Our data 
additionally shows that the issue, ceteris paribus, is more important for older citizens, and as a 
reform that widens the window of opportunity for economic actors, it is more popular among 
right-wing voters.  
Table 4. Regression results on support for gradual and part-time retirement, and help for older 
workers 
 Support  for 
 
Gradual 
retirement 
Part-time 
retirement 
Training for 
older workers 
Individual-level characteristics     
Male     
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  – –   
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)      
Worse off (financial problems)     
Has a job  +    
Has a university degree  + + + 
Right-wing (strongly)   +  + 
Left-wing (strongly)     + 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime     
Pension level/wealth (score)   –  – 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory 
system (score)  +  (+)*   
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.01); * p<0.05 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
 
The next question is about the equal access of older workers to training in order to stay in the 
labour market longer.
13 A total of 56% of respondents support the idea. There are significant 
cross-country differences of opinion, however, and the variance is less clearly structured. 
Generally speaking, this proposal is less popular in countries with more generous pension 
regimes.  
This picture changes if the issue is approached from the opposite side. Two survey questions 
ask respondents about statements that are in sharp contrast to the programme of gradual 
retirement. One of them is that “older workers should be forced to retire at a fixed age”. In spite 
of the widespread support for the idea of gradual retirement, this proposal enjoys the support of 
the majority of respondents: 57% agree with it and only 37% are against it. Along with Greek 
respondents, among whom a mere 5% are against a fixed retirement age, respondents from Italy, 
Spain, France and Belgium also tend to view flexible retirement unfavourably and only 20%, 
21%, 23% and 25% of them, respectively, oppose the idea of a statutory fixed retirement age. 
The proportion of opponents of the fixed retirement age is much higher in Finland, the UK, 
Sweden and the Netherlands: 66%, 62%, 59% and 57%, respectively. As the regression analysis 
also shows, there are more persons against flexible retirement in countries with large and 
                                                 
13 The question is “I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree…Older workers should be helped to stay in the labour market by being offered the same 
access to training as younger workers.” 10 | JANKY & GÁL 
generous pension schemes. Conversely, a larger than average share of respondents accept the 
idea of flexibility where funded pillars and market-based solutions are more important. As far as 
individual-level characteristics are concerned, being informed and politically aware may matter 
(Table 5). In addition, the most highly educated respondents are also more likely than others are 
to oppose a fixed retirement age.  
Table 5. Regression results on opinions about pushing older workers out of the labour market 
  Older workers should not… 
 
…be forced to retire
at a fixed age 
 
…give up work to make 
way for the young
 
Individual-level characteristics 
  
Male 
  
Expected remaining active lifetime (years) 
  
Better off (high living standard AND has a job) 
  
Worse off (financial problems) 
  –
 
Has a job  +
  +
 
Has a university degree  +
  +
 
Right-wing (strongly)  +
  +
 
Left-wing (strongly)  +
  
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime
  
Pension level/wealth (score)  (–)*
  –
 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory 
system (score)  +
  +
 
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.01); * p<0.05 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
  
The other statement in the questionnaire, which is contrary to the programme of keeping the 
older labour force in the labour market, links retirement to alleviating youth unemployment. The 
majority embraces the idea that a possible (and desirable) way to decrease youth unemployment 
is to force workers in their late 50s out of employment (see Boeri, 2004).
14  Only 38% of 
respondents oppose such a proposal. The impact of country- and individual-level characteristics 
on attitudes is somewhat similar to those described above (Table 5 and Figure 4).  
In light of the above distributions, the main conclusion is that most respondents hold 
inconsistent views on the labour market participation of the elderly, making the framing of the 
issue particularly important. Wording influences answers. In addition, the institutional 
framework that people see around them is also a strong determinant of preferences. So a kind of 
status quo effect is observed here. 
                                                 
14 The question is “I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or 
strongly disagree...People in their late 50s should give up work to make way for younger and unemployed 
people.” PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 11 
2.5 Gender  equality 
Documents presenting the view of the Commission on pension systems strongly emphasise the 
importance of gender equality (e.g. European Commission, 1999, pp. 6, 8). Career patterns of 
women and their longer life expectancy make them prone to poverty even in the generous public 
pension schemes of Europe. More importantly, some of the proposed reforms aiming at 
improving sustainability may result in an increasing risk of poverty among women. It is a hard 
task for policy-makers to strengthen incentives for labour market participation while, at the 
same time, acknowledging work within the family, which at present is still unevenly distributed 
between the two genders. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer survey does not help us contribute 
to solving this policy dilemma. The questions regarding gender equality address the issue at a 
general level. It seems that the principle of equal treatment is deeply embedded in modern 
European democracies. Thus, the vast majority of respondents support gender equality in any 
rules irrespective of their diverse impacts on the welfare of the two genders. 
An overwhelming majority, 91% of both male and female respondents, are in favour of gender 
equality of pension benefits.
15 In Germany and Austria the level of support for the idea is a bit 
lower (81% and 83%, respectively), but otherwise the distribution of answers are similar all 
over Europe, as they are among various age groups. A similar majority (90%) think that men 
and women should provide the same level of contributions for their old-age benefits.
16 Taking 
account of the gender-dependent career paths, the two distributions contradict each other, unless 
the latter question is interpreted as one referring only to contribution rates of currently working 
men and women. In Austria and Germany, the level of support for equality is lower in the case 
of this latter issue as well.  
                                                 
15 The question is “For each of the following, please indicate whether, you think, men and women should 
be treated equally or not…[concerning the] amount they receive when they retire 1) equally, 2) not 
equally”. 
16 The question is “For each of the following, please indicate whether, you think, men and women should 
be treated equally or not…[concerning the] contributions they make for their retirement pension 1) 
equally, 2) not equally”. Kohl (2003) also analysed this question. 
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The idea of equality of retirement ages is also preferred by an overwhelming majority of 
respondents,
17 although the proportion of those favouring equality is a bit lower in this case: 
83% of respondents (84% of men and 82% of women) think that men and women should have 
the same retirement age. Cross-country variance reflects some differences: 99% of Danish and 
97% of Swedish respondents support equality of retirement ages, while the corresponding rates 
are only 66% and 65% in Greece and Austria, respectively.  
Finally, empirical evidence shows that intentions to make it easier for women to combine family 
and work reflect popular preferences: 82% of respondents would support such efforts.  
2.6 Immigration 
Several Commission communications point out the importance of the demographic composition 
of the population and suggest a discussion about immigration as a partial solution (European 
Commission, 2005a, p. 6; 2005b). The Eurobarometer survey includes a question about 
immigration in the pension reform context. Thus, we look at the issue very briefly. Thirty-seven 
percent of respondents agree with the statement that more foreigners should be allowed to 
immigrate in order to alleviate the financial burden on pension systems.
18  Countries 
significantly differ regarding immigration.  
As we know from a vast body of literature, many kinds of country-level and individual 
characteristics determine preferences on immigration policy, most of which are not related to 
those considered in relation to attitudes about pension systems. Still, a correlation can be 
observed between the characteristics of the pension system and the level of support for 
immigration (Table 6).  
Table 6. Regression results on attitudes towards immigration 
 
More foreigners should be allowed 
to work in our country
 
Individual-level characteristics 
 
Male 
 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years) 
 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)  
 
Worse off (financial problems)  –
 
Has a job 
 
Has a university degree  +
 
Right-wing (strongly) 
 
Left-wing (strongly)  +
 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
 
Pension level/wealth (score) 
 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory system (score)  +
 
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.01) 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
                                                 
17 The question is “For each of the following, please indicate whether, you think, men and women should 
be treated equally or not…[concerning the] age at which they can retire 1) equally, 2) not equally”. 
18 The exact wording of the question is as follows: “Please tell me for each of the following whether you 
strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or strongly disagree…More foreigners should be allowed 
to work in our country so that there will be more people who pay the contributions and taxes needed to 
finance pensions.” PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 13 
In generous regimes the idea of inviting new immigrants seems to be somewhat (albeit not 
significantly) more popular. It is easy to rationalise this, since a larger system implies greater 
financial problems. The proposal for increased immigration is also popular in countries in which 
private, funded pillars play an important role. 
We did not carry out such a detailed analysis of the determinants of attitudes towards 
immigration as done in earlier studies concentrating on this issue alone. Nevertheless, even our 
over-simplistic regression analysis presents some interesting results. Basically, education and 
ideology are the most important individual characteristics in our model. Educated persons and 
voters on the left are more likely than others are to be in favour of immigration. 
3.  Intra- and intergenerational solidarity 
In this section, we analyse European public opinion with regard to two general directions of the 
redistribution of resources: intergenerational and intra-generational redistribution within the 
pension system. 
Most empirical surveys on the welfare state concentrate on explaining preferences towards 
intra-generational redistribution, which is redistribution from the rich to the poor. In the case of 
public pension systems, however, intergenerational redistribution between overlapping 
generations is equally relevant. The winners and losers may differ in the two types of 
redistribution. We put special emphasis on separating the mechanisms that may influence 
preferences towards intergenerational transfers from those shaping opinions on intra-
generational redistribution among pensioners.  
The design of the questionnaire affords the opportunity to capture some of this distinction 
(Kohl, 2003), although intergenerational redistribution could only be defined for the present and 
not between the entire life cycles of generations. In this section, we concentrate on separating 
supporters and opponents of the two forms of redistribution.  
In PAYG schemes, an increase in contributions implies the growth of intergenerational 
redistribution. Our indicator of the preferred level of intergenerational redistribution is based on 
attitudes towards current contributions and pensions. It is derived from two questions: the first 
one considers the possibility of an increase in contributions and pensions, and the second one 
addresses the possible decrease in pensions and contributions. Below we delve into the details. 
The questionnaire approaches intra-generational redistribution within the pension systems from 
several aspects. There are various questions concerning this issue and we extracted information 
regarding three of them to indicate respondents’ attitudes towards intra-generational 
redistribution. One such question addresses the issue directly, but at a fairly general level. The 
other two questions do not mention redistribution explicitly. They focus on special policies, 
such as state pensions for the rich and the relation between past contributions and current 
pensions, both bearing consequences for intra-generational redistribution.  
We examine the influences of self-interest, ideology, the neighbourhood effect and the 
institutional framework on public attitudes. Our empirical model relies on the assumptions of 
political economy models as well as a rich tradition of empirical research on welfare attitudes. 
Our results show that once the two types of redistribution are clearly distinguished, some 
previously hidden groups of supporters of reforms become more visible. 
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3.1  Previous evidence of public opinion 
Sociological literature on public preferences towards welfare systems provides theories of class-
based solidarity and other types of ideological influences on popular support for intra-
generational redistribution. The application of these concepts to attitudes towards 
intergenerational redistribution, however, is theoretically unfounded (Irwin, 1996). Models of 
political economy, by contrast, examine the mechanisms that establish and maintain unfunded 
public pension systems (for comprehensive surveys see Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin, 1999b, 
1999c; Persson & Tabellini, 2000; and Galasso & Profeta, 2002). They focus on 
intergenerational redistribution, but intra-generational redistribution also appears in some 
models. Below we mostly rely on models by Browning (1975), Tabellini (2000) and Mulligan 
& Sala-i-Martin (1999a, 2003) in applying the effects of age, income, labour market status and 
conditions in the respondents’ neighbourhoods to explain public preferences.
19  
The empirical sociological literature concentrates on the determinants of attitudes towards intra-
generational redistribution. Results show that the best predictors are direct individual gains and 
general ideological stance – which in turn may also carry the effects of individual gains 
indirectly (e.g. Gelissen, 2000; Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors, 1997) and the 
institutional structure of the welfare system (Svallfors, 1997; Blomberg & Kroll, 1999; 
Gelissen, 2000; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Gevers et al., 2000). Gelissen (2001) studies the 
preferred role of the state and the individual in providing old-age security. He does not focus 
directly and explicitly on intra-generational redistribution as such, but rather examines 
preferences regarding general solidarity in the pension system. His analysis mostly confirms 
previous results on general issues and certain sub-systems of the welfare state. Workers, 
younger respondents, men, the middle-classes, right-wing voters and those who are not 
members of trade unions are more likely to emphasise individual responsibility. Regarding 
institutional-level effects, demand for state intervention is lower in countries with smaller 
pension regimes.  
Several studies also address the issue of generational self-interest in welfare preferences (e.g. 
Hamil-Luker, 2001; Silverstein et al., 2000). Yet the interpretation of results on 
intergenerational redistribution is not as straightforward as in the case of intra-generational 
redistribution. Empirical evidence does not support the prediction of a sharp discrepancy 
between the opinions of various generations. A series of researches show that many young and 
middle-aged respondents support several aspects of the existing social security scheme and the 
level of support among them is often as high as among the current beneficiaries (Silverstein et 
al., 2000; Hamil-Luker, 2001).   
Economists more often concentrate on the issue of intergenerational redistribution in their 
empirical research on welfare preferences. Boeri et al. (2002) analyse public opinion in some 
European countries. They find that young, rich and educated male respondents are more likely 
to support downsizing the pension system. Their results also show a significant effect of 
ideology: left-wing voters are more likely to be in favour of a larger system than are right-wing 
voters. Boeri (2004) analyses, among others, opinions on the optimal retirement age, which may 
have consequences for intergenerational redistribution as well. The more educated and more 
informed are more likely to support an increase in the retirement age. It is surprising that the 
marginal effect of income is negative on the support for higher retirement ages. 
 
 
                                                 
19 See a detailed review of the relevant political economy models of social security in Janky (2005). PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 15 
3.2 Basic  distributions 
We use two interrelated questions from the survey to create a means of measuring public 
opinion on intergenerational redistribution. The first one states that current pension levels 
should be maintained even if this means higher contribution rates. The other one says that 
contributions should not be raised even if this results in a lower level of old-age benefits. While 
22% of respondents gave inconsistent answers agreeing with both statements, 41% consistently 
rejected reductions in pensions. We compare them, the supporters of higher intergenerational 
transfers, with the rest of the respondents (Figure 5).  
 
Intra-generational redistribution is captured by questioning respondents’ attitudes to three 
statements: the first one states that rich people should not receive a state pension, the second one 
states that the pension system should contribute to greater equality and the third one states that 
pension benefits should be strictly based on contributions. Some 13% of the respondents fall 
into the perfect ‘equaliser’ category (by answering that they agree with the first two statements 
and disagree with the last one). In order to achieve a larger variation in the dependent variable, 
all those who matched the equaliser category in at least two of these three cases we coded as ‘1’. 
Hence, the proportion of those coded as ‘1’ increased to 56% (Figure 6). 
Figure 5. Opinions on intergenerational redistribution
68,6%
52,9%
41,0%
Agree: Current pension
levels should be maintained
even if this means raising
taxes 
Disagree: Contribution rates
should not be raised even if
this means lower pension
levels
Intersection of the previous
two groups
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001)
Figure 6. Opinions on intra-generational redistribution in the 
pension system
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3.3 Regression  analysis 
We derive many of our conclusions by comparing the effects of the same explanatory variables 
on the two different dependent variables of the intra-generational and the intergenerational 
model, respectively. Consequently, we used the same sets of explanatory variables in both 
models.
20 There is a large set of variables. For the sake of tractability, they are grouped into 
eight categories: demography, current income, income prospects, pension prospects, bargaining 
power, ideology, neighbourhood effects and institutions.
21  
Demography. Gender does not influence preferences on redistribution (Table 7). The expected 
remaining active lifetime does not affect attitudes towards intra-generational redistribution but it 
strongly shapes preferences on intergenerational transfers. Younger respondents are less likely 
to support further increases in contributions and benefits. This tendency reveals an important 
difference in the motives behind a seemingly general opposition to pension reform. 
Income. Respondents’ financial situation is an important factor shaping opinions (Table 7). 
Household heads having high living standards, active and retired in concert, are resistant to a 
larger redistribution among pensioners. Regarding intergenerational transfers, workers with a 
high-income status are more likely than other workers are to resist tax increases. This finding 
does not hold for richer pensioners.  
Those having financial problems are more likely to support stronger intra-generational 
redistribution. That being stated, an intriguing result of the analysis is that workers who suffer 
from financial problems are not more but rather less supportive of a more generous pension 
system than are individuals who have no such problems (see Boeri, 2004). This result is at odds 
with the predictions of some of the political economy models on social security. Nevertheless, 
as we emphasised above, the poor are not necessarily interested in a larger social security 
system (Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin, 1999b). Workers with low wages and inactive persons in the 
active age group may rationally oppose initiatives that may extract money from other welfare 
programmes currently helping them. 
The questionnaire also contains a variable revealing the self-evaluation of old-age benefits by 
pensioners. The indicator has no effect on opinion of intra-generational redistribution within the 
pension systems. Still, those who have low pensions are more likely to support tax increases in 
order to avoid any decrease of the general level of old-age benefits.  
Income prospects. We used labour market status, job type and educational level as indicators of 
future income prospects. Having a job has only a weak impact on attitudes towards intra-
generational redistribution (Table 7). Nevertheless, students (at universities and colleges in most 
cases in the sample) who are not only young but are also likely to have higher income prospects 
predictably oppose the idea of tax increases. Respondents with a university degree are more 
likely to be against a strong redistribution within the pension system and between generations. 
Those with only basic education, ceteris paribus, are more likely to oppose the preservation of 
current old-age benefit levels at the cost of higher contributions. This finding indicates a similar 
mechanism at work as in the case of persons with low incomes; however, as this regression 
analysis makes it clear, education has a separate effect. 
Income prospects may be sensitive to the remaining active lifetime. We checked for this in 
some cases. Our results show that the effect of education on welfare preferences negatively 
correlates to the length of the remaining active lifetime. 
                                                 
20 See Janky & Gál (2006) for hypotheses and other issues of model-building. 
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Table 7. Regression results on attitudes towards intra-generational redistribution and 
intergenerational transfers in the pension system (part 1) 
 
Intra-generational 
redistribution
 
   Intergenerational 
transfers
 
Demography: Gender and age 
  
Male 
  
Not retired  
  
Remaining active lifetime 
  –
 
Income 
  
High living standard AND main income AND has a job   –
  –
 
High living standard AND main income AND retired  –
  
Financial problems  +
  –
 
Financial problems AND retired 
  
Has low pension benefits 
  +
 
Income prospects 
  
Student  –
  –
 
Has a job 
  
Self-employed or top manager 
  
Self-employed professional 
  
Self-employed professional BY SQRT (remaining active 
lifetime) 
  
University degree  –
  –
 
University degree BY SQRT (remaining active lifetime)  
  +
 
Only primary education 
  –
 
Pension prospects 
  
Main expected source of income in old age is private 
  
Fear from poverty in old age (among the active)  +
  +
 
Bargaining power 
  
Job in the private sector 
  +
 
Union member 
  +
 
Job in public administration 
  +
 
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.1) 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
 
Pension prospects. As regards pension prospects, the empirical evidence shows that 
respondents of active age who fear old-age poverty are more supportive of redistribution among 
pensioners as well as between generations (Table 7). This finding has an important consequence 
for communication about pension reform. If the main argument for reform is the 
unsustainability of the current level of pensions and contributions, respondents may become 
alarmed about their future old-age income and vote for policies that would further deteriorate 
the long-term balance of the system. 
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As mentioned above, such higher-than-average support for intra-generational redistribution 
cannot be observed among pensioners who reported currently low benefits (and who not only 
fear low pensions in the future).  
Bargaining power. A job in public administration makes respondents more tolerant towards 
taxes: they support the maintenance of the present level of old-age benefits (Table 7). This 
could be the case because their potentially strong bargaining power can make the net income of 
civil servants less dependent on tax levels. Similarly, union members have stronger than average 
bargaining power, making their net income more protected than in less unionised sectors. 
Indeed, union members are more likely to support the maintenance of the present level of 
benefits. On the other hand, our data do not show any significant effects of union membership 
or a job in public administration on attitudes towards intra-generational redistribution. 
Workers in the private sector are more supportive of a larger system than are employees of 
public companies or those working in public education and health care. The regression 
coefficient is highly significant. Even an additional exploratory analysis could not bring us 
closer to understanding this phenomenon yet. 
Ideology. The estimated effects of indicators of ideology present a fairly clear picture (Table 8). 
Left-wing voters support intra-generational redistribution as well as a possible increase in 
intergenerational transfers. By contrast, respondents who blame the poor for their fate – often 
associated with right-wing ideology – oppose redistribution both within and across generations. 
The effect of right-wing ideology shapes preferences in a different way among pensioners. 
Whereas individuals blaming the poor for their fate are against redistribution of all kinds, when 
this attitude is held by pensioners it is not associated with the rejection of higher contributions 
and pensions. The insurance and assistance characteristics of old-age benefits may not be fully 
distinct. Active workers may be prone to see it as a welfare transfer, whereas the elderly may 
purely interpret it within the terms of an insurance contract.  
Neighbourhood effect.  We also incorporated indicators of a neighbourhood effect into our 
models. The presence of poverty in the neighbourhood seems to increase the strength of social 
solidarity (Table 8). Respondents surrounded by poor persons are more likely to support intra-
generational redistribution as well as more extensive intergenerational transfers.  
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime. As regards the current size of the pension 
system, intra-generational redistribution receives stronger support in more targeted systems, 
whereas a further increase of taxes and contributions is less popular in larger systems. 
Nonetheless, owing to the small sample size at the country level, those effects are not significant 
at the usual levels. 
One of the most intriguing results of our analysis is the effect of the role of funded components 
of the pension system on preferences for intergenerational transfers. Individuals are more likely 
to support tax increases in regimes where private solutions and funded pillars are more 
important, in order to maintain the existing level of benefits in the unfunded pillars (Table 8). It 
is a highly significant effect, though the estimate is based on the data of only 15 countries. 
Further research is needed to explore the factors behind this finding. PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 19 
Table 8. Regression results on attitudes towards intra-generational redistribution and 
intergenerational transfers within the pension system (part 2) 
 
Intra-generational 
redistribution 
 
Intergenerational 
transfers
 
Ideology 
   
 
Blames the poor for their fate  –
  – 
 
Blames the poor for their fate AND retired 
  + 
 
Right-wing (strongly)  –
   
 
Right-wing AND retired 
   
 
Left-wing (strongly)  +
  + 
 
Left-wing AND retired 
   
 
Neighbourhood effect 
   
 
Has a small child 
   
 
Children are necessary in one’s life 
  – 
 
Poor in the neighbourhood  +
  + 
 
Poor in the neighbourhood AND retired 
   
 
Not retired AND partner is retired 
   
 
Retired AND household head has a job 
   
 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
   
 
Pension level/wealth (score) 
   
 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory system 
(score) 
  + 
 
Note: ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs indicate significant coefficients (p<0.1) 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
  
4.  Discussion and conclusions 
In this section, we summarise what we have learned from the Eurobarometer survey. Instead of 
replicating the results presented above, we attempt to draw policy conclusions.  
Our main conclusion is that, for all the widespread resistance to most reform proposals, it may 
be possible to form coalitions of the supporters of certain reform components. Certainly as far 
as single policy measures are concerned, reform-oriented social groups usually comprise only a 
minority of the population. A careful design of institutional changes, however, might lead to the 
emergence of reform coalitions whose members strongly support at least some features of the 
proposed new system but do not (strongly) resist other measures of the new scheme. 
Nevertheless, there are obvious trade-offs between the political feasibility and financial 
sustainability of pension institutions. Building a majority coalition for pension reform almost 
inevitably compromises on economic efficiency. What we are saying here is that certain 
measures improving the current pension regimes in Europe may receive popular support. 
There is a discrepancy between the awareness of problems regarding population ageing, such as 
the unsustainability of PAYG pension systems, and the lack of willingness to solve them. A 
majority of European citizens are aware of the problems of demographic trends in advanced 
post-industrial societies. In this respect, the results of the Eurobarometer survey are in line with  
 20 | JANKY & GÁL 
other research carried out on public attitudes. Awareness, however, is not translated into popular 
support for reforms, which aim at tackling the problems. This latter experience also resembles 
the results of other surveys.  
We also found that the poor realise that higher average pensions, which imply higher 
contributions, do not necessarily help them. Apparently, poor respondents also realise that they 
are potential beneficiaries of intra-generational redistribution within the pension system. That is, 
they are more likely to support intra-generational redistribution while opposing an increase of 
contribution rates in order to maintain the present average level of pensions. In this respect, the 
preferences of the poor resemble those of right-wing voters. This converging line of support is 
one on which a potential reform coalition could be formed. 
Ideologically determined left-wing voters support a large and fairly redistributive system. They 
may aim at helping the poor by supporting large systems with high contribution rates and 
extensive intra-generational redistribution, while those who are actually worse off have 
somewhat different preferences. As mentioned above, they support intra-generational 
redistribution, but they are more likely to oppose feeding the ever-growing present regimes by 
increasing contributions, thus more closely resembling right-wing voters in their preferences.  
The attitudes of union members can be interpreted more easily as referring to their narrow self-
interests than left-wing ideology. They support a larger system, but at the same time, they are 
not more likely to be in favour of intra-generational redistribution than non-unionised workers 
are. In this way, the attitudes of union members are closer to those of the middle classes than to 
the opinions of the poor. 
Responses to the questions of the Eurobarometer survey show that how the question is framed 
influences attitudes. Opinions about older workers and flexible retirement, for instance, strongly 
depend on the question format. Any proposal could receive majority support, irrespective of its 
position on flexible retirement. Similar contradictions could be observed in the attitudes towards 
gender equality. All statements promoting equal treatment of the two genders are widely 
supported, independent of their consequences on the gender gap in income opportunities at old 
age. Such framing effects point to the fact that many respondents are uncertain and public 
discussion of pension issues could modify their preferences.  
Our results reveal that the intentions of the Commission to re-frame public discussion of 
pension policy by concentrating on the real effects on poverty and social integration could, 
potentially, be well accepted by the general public, particularly by the poor of active age. 
Moreover, supporters of left-wing ideologies could also be influenced by re-framed public 
discourse. 
We might conclude that a shift from ideologically charged questions (such as those on 
privatisation or the general size of the public scheme) to the identification of the real losers of 
the current regimes and their prospects under proposed reforms may help policy-makers. If 
efforts to secure the sustainability of the pension systems were successfully separated from 
intentions to diminish the overall size of the welfare state, then pension reforms would be more 
feasible.  
5. Summary 
In this study, we have addressed the political economy puzzles of long-needed pension reforms 
and the strong popular support for the existing designs of public pension schemes in Europe. 
We have used data from the special Eurobarometer survey, Pension Policy and Pension Reform 
(European Opinion Research Group, 2004), which was carried out in September and October 
2001 in the 15 EU member countries. We have studied opinions on the role of funded pillars, PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 21 
retirement age, the labour market participation of older workers, gender equality and 
immigration. In addition, we have also analysed popular support for more general principles. In 
particular, our modelling strategy has aimed at separating attitudes favouring intergenerational 
transfers from those favouring intra-generational redistribution among pensioners. Our results 
reveal that various social groups may support the present systems for different reasons. The 
attitudes of pensioners may differ from those of the active cohorts. Age and income prospects 
influence the opinion of the working-age population. The empirical evidence also shows that if 
preferences are strongly influenced by traditional political ideologies (left- and right-wing alike) 
or pressure groups such as unions, adequacy and sustainability are more likely to be in conflict 
in the future.  
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Appendix 1. Description of individual-level variables 
adopted in regression analyses 
Male: a dichotomous (dummy) variable (females are coded by ‘0’, males by ‘1’). 
Not retired: a dichotomous (dummy) variable (retired persons are coded by ‘0’, all other 
respondents by ‘1’). 
Remaining active lifetime: the difference between the current age and expected retirement age 
(Q48, “At what age do you intend to retire?”). Its value is zero for retired persons. Missing 
values are substituted by the median (60 years). 
High living standard: a dichotomous (dummy) variable that is coded by ‘1’ if the respondent 
enjoys a comfortable life (if the respondent answered, “very easily” to Q5, “How well do you 
get by with the income of your household?”). As with many opinion polls, the Eurobarometer 
survey gives a poor measurement of personal income, so we had to use proxies. Our exploratory 
analysis shows that subjective indicators function better than objective indicators. 
Main income: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating whether the respondent is the head of 
a household. It coded by ‘1’ if the respondent answered yes to question D19, “Are you in your 
household, the person who contributes most to the household income?” 
Financial problems: a dichotomous (dummy) variable that is created using several questions, 
including the following: Q5, “How well do you get by with the income of your household?”; 
Q9/1-3, “In the last twelve, months, have you, or any member of you household, had problems 
in…1) paying the rent or mortgage, 2) paying the water, gas, electricity or heating bills, 3) 
paying for food?”; Q11, “Do you ever happen to see for yourself the conditions in which these 
people [poor people mentioned in Q10] really live?”; and Q16, “In the last five years, have you 
ever been unemployed or not?”). 
Has low pension benefits: a dichotomous (dummy) variable based on the subjective evaluation 
of the level of old-age benefits of the (retired) respondent. It is coded by ‘1’ if the respondent 
answered “with great difficulty”’ to Q58, “Do you think that the state pension you receive now, 
allows you to get by?” 
Student: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating student status (coded by ‘1’ if the 
respondent is a student and by ‘0’ otherwise). 
Has a job: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating labour market status (it is coded by ‘1’ 
if the respondent has a job and by ‘0’ otherwise). 
Self-employed or top manager: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating labour market status 
(coded by ‘1’ if the respondent is self-employed or a top manager and by ‘0’ otherwise). 
Self-employed professional: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating labour market status 
(coded by ‘1’ if the respondent is a self-employed professional and by ‘0’ otherwise). 
Self-employed professional BY SQRT (remaining active lifetime): Professionals usually have a 
steeper age/earnings profile than other workers. Thus, current income may imply different 
future income paths. At any income level, the longer remaining active lifetime of professionals 
implies a larger, expected average value of future losses owing to intra-generational 
redistribution. Our ‘interaction variable’ captures this information. 
University degree: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating educational level (coded by ‘1’ 
if the respondent has a university degree or is a student older than 20 years). PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 25 
Only primary education: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating educational level (coded 
by ‘1’ if the respondent has only a primary level of education). 
Main expected source of income in old age is private: a dichotomous (dummy) variable that 
separates those whose expected income sources after retirement are mainly private from all 
other respondents; this variable reflects the expectations of persons who are currently not retired 
(based on Q52, “Which of the following will probably be your main source of income after 
retirement?”). 
Fear of poverty in old age (among the active): a dichotomous (dummy) variable based on the 
question that asks active respondents about their fears of old-age financial insecurity. It is coded 
by ‘1’ if the respondent selected the answer, “with great difficulty” in reply to Q53, “Do you 
think that the state pension you will receive when you retire, will allow you to get by?”  
Job in the private sector: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating working place 
characteristics (coded by ‘1’ if the respondent has a job in the private sector and by ‘0’ 
otherwise – including the non-working population); the coding is based on Q27, “What does the 
firm or organization that you currently work for actually make or do?” 
Union member: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating union membership (coded by ‘1’ if 
the respondent is a member of a union and by ‘0’ otherwise) 
Job in public administration: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating work place 
characteristics (coded by ‘1’ if the respondent has a job in public administration and by ‘0’ 
otherwise – including the non-working population). The coding is based on Q27, “What does 
the firm or organization that you currently work for actually make or do?” 
Blames the poor for their fate: a dichotomous (dummy) variable distinguishing those who think 
that the poor are to blame for their fate, which is based on Q14, “Here are several reasons, 
which might explain why people are socially excluded. Which three do you think are the most 
common?” It is coded by ‘1’ if the respondent, answering this question, selected at least one of 
the following statements: “They don’t plan for the future”, “They are lazy”, “They have too 
many children” or “They have chosen to be like this”. 
Right-wing (strongly): a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating ideological stance, coded by 
‘1’ if the respondent positioned his/her views on grades 8, 9 or 10 when answering question D1, 
“In political matters people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on 
this [10-point] scale?” 
Left-wing (strongly): a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating ideological stance, coded by 
‘1’ if the respondent positioned his/her views on grades 1, 2 or 3 when answering question D1, 
“In political matters people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on 
this [10-point] scale?” 
Has a small child: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating whether the respondent has 
small children, coded by ‘1’ if the respondent stated, “I have a child at home under five years of 
age” when answering Q18/3. 
Children are necessary in one’s life: a dichotomous (dummy) variable indicating attitudes 
towards childbearing, coded by ‘1’ if the respondent stated, “Having children is absolutely 
necessary to live properly nowadays” when answering Q2/4. 
Poor in the neighbourhood: a dichotomous (dummy) variable about the presence of poverty in 
the neighbourhood of the respondent, coded by ‘1’ if the respondent answered “situation of 
extreme poverty” or “situation of poverty” to Q10, “In the area [where] you live, are there 
people who live in one or other of the following situations?”  
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Appendix 2. Regression coefficients 
Table A1. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on opinions of 
whether population ageing will pose a major problem  
  Population ageing will be a major problem
Individual-level characteristics   
 
Male  -.070
**   
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  -.010
****   
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)   .152
*   
Worse off (financial problems)  .076
*   
Has a job  .214
****   
Has a university degree  .356
****   
Right-wing (strongly)  .247
****   
Left-wing (strongly)  .156
****   
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
   
Pension level/wealth (score)  .355
****   
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory system 
(score)  -.065
   
Intercept  .120
   
-2 log likelihood  21,553  
 
N  15,943  
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
Table A2. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on opinions about 
whether PAYG schemes, occupational systems or privately funded arrangements 
should dominate 
  PAYG system should not dominate
 
Individual-level characteristics 
 
Male .213
****   
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  -.001
   
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)   .227
***   
Worse off (financial problems)  -.228
****   
Has a job  .240
****   
Has a university degree  .346
****   
Right-wing (strongly)  .285
****   
Left-wing (strongly)  -.012
   
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
   
Pension level/wealth (score)  -.065
   
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory system 
(score) .309
*   
Intercept -1.088
****   
-2 log likelihood  18,691  
 
N 15,943
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). PUBLIC OPINION ON PENSION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE | 27 
Table A3. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on attitudes towards 
retirement age and pension benefits 
 
Increase of 
retirement age
 
Higher pension 
for later 
retirement 
Lower pension 
for early 
retirement 
Individual-level characteristics        
Male .092
**  .224
****  .208
**** 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  .001
  -.006
****  -.001
 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)  -.075
  .166
**  .172
** 
Worse off (financial problems)  -.044
  -.032
  -.124
**** 
Has a job  -.115
****  -.031
  -.089
** 
Has a university degree  .184
****  .000
  .202
**** 
Right-wing (strongly)  .195
****  .166
****  .178
**** 
Left-wing (strongly)  .027
  -.139
****  .030
 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime 
   
Pension level/wealth (score)  -.147
*  .079
  .409
**** 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory 
system (score)  -.032
  -.089
  -.068
 
Intercept -1.287
****  -.194
**  -.500
**** 
-2 log likelihood  17,200   22,444   21,761  
N 15,943 15,943 15,943  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
Table A4. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on support for 
gradual and part-time retirement, and help for older workers 
 Support  for 
 
Gradual 
retirement 
Part-time 
retirement 
Training for 
older workers 
Individual-level characteristics     
Male .055
  .064
*  .036
 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  -.005
****  -.009
****  -.002
** 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job)   .016
  .137
  .015
 
Worse off (financial problems)  -.016
  .014
  .064
* 
Has a job  .172
****  .036
  .058
* 
Has a university degree  .137
***  .146
****  .191
**** 
Right-wing (strongly)  .122
**  .269
****  .168
**** 
Left-wing (strongly)  .111
**  .005
  .120
*** 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime
   
Pension level/wealth (score)  -.073
  -.324
****  -.254
*** 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory 
system (score)  .559
****  .209
**  .023
 
Intercept 1.252
****  .583
****  .356
**** 
-2 log likelihood  16,909   21,385   21,825  
N  15,943  15,943  15,943  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 28 | JANKY & GÁL 
Table A5. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on opinions about 
pushing older workers out of the labour market 
  Older workers should not... 
 
…be forced to retired 
at a fixed age 
 
…give up work to make 
way for the young
 
Individual-level characteristics 
  
Male -.036
  -.039
 
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)  .001
  .000
 
Better off (high living standard AND has a job) .015
  .050
 
Worse off (financial problems)  -.090
**  -.173
**** 
Has a job  .100
***  .111
*** 
Has a university degree  .368
****  .431
**** 
Right-wing (strongly)  .271
****  .225
**** 
Left-wing (strongly)  .155
****  .110
** 
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime
  
Pension level/wealth (score)  -.345
**  -.487
**** 
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory 
system (score)  .600
****  .521
*** 
Intercept -.395
***  -.353
** 
-2 log likelihood  19,374
  19,351
 
N 15,943
  15,943
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
Table A6. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on attitudes towards 
immigration 
 
More foreigners should be allowed to 
work in our country
 
Individual-level characteristics    
 
Male   .067
**   
Expected remaining active lifetime (years)    .002
**   
Better off (high living standard AND has a job )     .061
   
Worse off (financial problems)    -.094
***   
Has a job    -.054
   
Has a university degree    .265
****   
Right-wing (strongly)    -.005
   
Left-wing (strongly)    .271
****   
Country-level characteristics of the pension regime   
   
Pension level/wealth (score)    .148
   
Role of private/funded pillars in mandatory system 
(score)   .303
**   
Intercept   -.462
****   
-2 log likelihood    21,502  
 
N   15,943  
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
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Table A7. Regression coefficients of multilevel binomial logit regressions on attitudes towards 
intra-generational redistribution and intergenerational transfers 
 
Intra-generational 
redistribution 
 
Intergenerational 
transfers
 
Variables           B 
           B 
 
Macro level 
  
Size of the system  -0.10
  -0.08
 
Funding rate  -0.06
  0.24
*** 
Micro level 
  
Demography – Gender and age effects 
  
Male -0.00
  0.03
 
Not retired   0.09
  -0.02
 
Remaining active lifetime  0.00
  -0.02
**** 
Income effect 
  
High living standard AND main income AND has 
a job   -0.23
**  -0.18
*** 
High living standard AND main income AND 
retired -0.30
***  0.08
 
Financial problems  0.30
****  -0.15
**** 
Financial problems AND retired  0.06
  -0.05
 
Has low pension benefits  0.07
  0.32
*** 
Income prospects 
  
Student -0.14
*  -0.26
*** 
Has a job  0.01
  -0.08
 
Self-employed or top manager  -0.10
  -0.08
 
Self-employed professional  -0.51
  -0.02
 
Self-employed professional BY SQRT (remaining 
active lifetime)  0.14
  0.00
 
University degree  -0.20
**  -0.13
* 
University degree BY SQRT (remaining active 
lifetime)   0.02
  0.08
**** 
Only primary education  0.07
  -0.21
**** 
Pension prospects 
  
Main expected source of income in old age is 
private -0.04
  0.03
 
Fear of poverty in old age (among the active)  0.21
****  0.11
** 
Bargaining power 
  
Job in the private sector  -0.05
  0.18
**** 
Union member  0.02
  0.13
** 
Job in public administration  -0.13
  0.22
** 
Ideology 
  
Blames the poor for their fate  -0.13
****  -0.11
*** 
Blames the poor for their fate AND retired  0.00
  0.14
* 
Right-wing (strongly)  -0.17
***  -0.04
 
Right-wing AND retired  0.10
  0.08
 
Left-wing (strongly)  0.23
****  0.23
**** 
Left-wing AND retired  -0.03
  0.06
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Table A7. Continued 
Neighbourhood effects 
  
Has a small child  0.00
  -0.04
 
Children are necessary in one’s life  -0.05
  -0.13
**** 
Poor in the neighbourhood  0.15
***  0.19
**** 
Poor in the neighbourhood AND retired  0.02
  -0.04
 
Not retired AND partner is retired  -0.11
  -0.05
 
Retired AND the household head has a job  -0.19
  0.12
 
Intercept 0.19
***  0.11
*** 
-2 log likelihood  21,914
  21,602
 
N 15,943
  15,943
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001). 
 About AIM (Adequacy & Sustainability of Old-Age Income Maintenance) 
he AIM project aims at providing a strengthened conceptual and scientific basis for 
assessing the capacity of European pension systems to deliver adequate old age income 
maintenance in a context of low fertility and steadily increasing life expectancy. The 
main focus is on the capacity of social security systems to contribute to preventing poverty among the 
old and elderly and more generally to enable persons to take all appropriate measures to ensure stable 
or “desired” distribution of income over the full life cycle. In addition it will explore and examine the 
capacity of pension systems to attain broad social objectives with respect to inter- and intra 
generational solidarity.  
Furthermore it will examine the capacity of pension systems to allow workers to change job or to 
move temporarily out of the labour market and to adapt career patterns without losing vesting of 
pensions rights. The project will also address the specific challenges with respect to providing 
appropriate old age income for women. 
A general objective of the research project is to clearly identify and analyse the potential trade-offs 
between certain social policy objectives and overall stability of public debt.  
AIM is financed under the 6th EU Research Framework Programme. It started in May 2005 and 
includes partners from both the old and new EU member states. 
Participating institutes 
•  Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, Belgium, coordinator  
•  Federal Planning Bureau, FPB, Belgium  
•  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschafsforschung (German Institute for Economic Research), DIW, 
Germany  
•  Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos, (Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), ETLA, Finland  
•  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada , FEDEA, Spain  
•  Social and Cultural Planning Office, SCP, Netherlands 
•  Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica (Institute for Studies and Economic Analysis), ISAE, Italy  
•  National Institute for Economic and Social Research, NIESR, United Kingdom  
•  Centrum Analiz Spolleczno-Ekonomicznych (Center for Social and Economic Research), 
CASE, Poland  
•  Tarsadalomkutatasi Informatikai Egyesules (TARKI Social Research Informatics 
Centre), TARKI, Hungary  
•  Centre for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, CeRP, Italy  
•  Institute for Economic Research, IER, Slovak Republic  
•  Inštitut za ekonomska raziskovanja (Institute for economic research), IER, Slovenia  
T 